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terial from which the best results can be had by the old-fashioned disciplinary methods, which grew out of the conditions prevailing when soldiers were mostly of the serf class. Colonel Andrews tells the embryo officers at West Point that they must recognize these facts, and must become real leaders of their men by that self-control and self-development which will make them fit to lead soldiers of such character. Not at all new. The young leaders of the battalions of peaceful industry have been given such lessons these many years. Still, Colonel Andrews makes his argument in an orderly, readable, and helpful way to civilians as well as young officers.

But the thought that obtrudes constantly in reading his book has nothing whatever to do with the purpose which governed the writing of it. Agreeing, as one must, with all that he says about the mental and moral fiber of the men who make the armies of the present, and with what he says about the standards that must measure leadership of such men, one inevitably and frequently asks: "Why under heaven must it be necessary that such men have to be turned into soldiers, devoted to the insane business of killing other men?" The question has nothing to do with the intrinsic merit of "Military Manpower," but it will not down. When one reads: "The development of the modern man as an individual—a self-respecting, self-thinking, responsible member of the community in which he moves, whose opinion is asked and counts in matters of government and regulation—has made him fit material ready to the hand of the instructor to be trained for these new military requirements"—when one reads that and more like it, one cannot help exclaiming at the tragic anti-climax that war and preparation for war are essential to the development of that "modern man."

WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS.—The Story of the Peace Conference by Delegates. Edited by *Edward Mandell House and Charles Scymour*. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. Pp. I-XIII, 444. Appendix.

This book is a compilation of lectures delivered last fall in Philadelphia by men who were on the inside of the work of the American delegation at the Paris Conference, and necessarily it deserves the consideration of all seeking the truth about events in Paris, for it portrays facts with intimacy, even if the portrayal is governed in some degree by natural prepossessions and predilections. The discriminating reader may easily make the discounts that should be made on this account and still find meat for much thought. The authors of the several articles are often at some pains to free themselves of suspicion of coloring, as in the foreword by Colonel House, who speaks with definitely laudatory terms of Mr. Wilson, yet says that Clemenceau stands out the clearest-cut figure of all the big men of the conference.

The articles begin with one by Sidney Edward Mezes, chief of the Territorial Section of the American Mission, on "Preparations for Peace," which outlines some of the problems. Then there is one by Clive Day, chief of the Balkan Division of the Mission, on "The Atmosphere and Organization of the Peace Conference." From such starting points the contributions run on to specific issues presented before the conference, such as the German boundaries, Poland's future, the treatment of Austro-Hungary, the fight over Fiume and the Adriatic problem, Constantinople, the Armenian problem, protection of minorities in territories that were transferred, the called-for trial of the Kaiser, reparations, the economic settlement, the labor features, the economic administration during the armistice, and so on.

Here we have thoughts expressed by as many men as there are problems discussed. There is no single theme running through the articles; but the mere statement of the subjects treated, taken with the names of the authors, abundantly warrants the reading of the book.

In addition to Colonel House, Mr. Mezes, Mr. Day, and Mr. Seymour, mentioned as having parts in the work, the list of authors includes Dr. James Brown Scott, dealing with the trial of the Kaiser; Herbert Hoover, Samuel Gompers, Charles Homer Haskins, Robert Howard Lord, Douglas Wilson Johnson, Isaiah Bowman, William Linn Westermann, Manley Ottmer Hudson, Thomas William Lamont, writing

on reparations; Allyn Abbott Young and Admiral Henry Thomas Mayo, the latter dealing with the Atlantic fleet in the war. Also, there are articles on disarmament by General Tasker H. Bliss, and the making of the League of Nations by David Hunter Miller, while Colonel House contributes "The Versailles Peace in Retrospect."

Finally, there is an appendix, giving stenographic notes of questions and answers, following the delivery of the papers before the audiences in the Philadelphia Academy of Music. These questions and answers are illuminating, since the questions often reflect exactly the questions asked by the average man lacking detailed information, and the answers generally are to the point and more compact than in deliberately prepared discussions. One passage between Mr. Lamont and his audience is notably worth thinking of. He was asked if the greater thrift, industry, efficiency, and self-denial required for the payment of the indemnities did not mean a greater and stronger Germany when the burden passes, and he replied: "I should think so. I should decidedly think so. That is a thing the Allies had to fix; that is a thing they had to contemplate. We discussed that a good many times, and certain of the delegates, especially the French, feared that they might push the thing so that they would build up a gigantic machine over there in Germany, a Frankenstein that would ultimately overwhelm them, because of their increased efficiency, but they were willing to take the chance."

THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. By *L. Oppenheim*, *Whewell Professor of International Law in the University of Cambridge, England*. (From the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, Pamphlet Number 39.) The Clarendon Press. Pp. I-XII, 68.

In a foreword Dr. James Brown Scott, long a friend of Professor Oppenheim, explains that this tractate was prepared in 1911 and was about to be published in English when the war broke out, and it was deemed better to postpone its appearance. Dr. Scott also explains that in lectures subsequent to the preparation of "The Future of International Law," and in his later "Treatise on International Law," Professor Oppenheim advanced views more favorable to the existing League of Nations than in the book under review. That borne in mind, every student of world affairs and champion of the cause of peace will be clarified mentally by the simple, yet comprehensive, treatment to be found in "The Future of International Law," as it traces the movement for ordered relations among men from antiquity on to the problems of the present day, dispassionately setting down the difficulties and the errors, the impossibilities and the reasonable hopes.

In this book Professor Oppenheim would have the organization of the world for peace based upon work accomplished at The Hague. He argues that the theoretical and physical possibility of a world State proves absolutely nothing as regards its utility and desirability, and states his belief that a world State would bring death, not life. The development of mankind, he holds, is inseparably bound with the national development of different peoples and States, and he finds a sound analogy between the healthful competition of individuals and the rivalry of peoples. More than that, he contends that war would not necessarily disappear from a world State. He cites the continued prevalence of the duel as evidence that laws alone, lacking the support of dominant opinion, cannot suffice; also he cites, in support of the theory that organization of States into a unit will not assure against war, the *Sonderbund* War in Switzerland, the Austro-Prussian War, and the American Civil War.

"Many States have already entered into numerous arbitration agreements with other individual States," he says, in picturing the other alternative, "to refer to arbitration disputed questions of law and questions about the interpretation of treaties, so far as these disputed questions do not touch the vital interests, independence, or honor of the parties. It is here that further development must begin." From the point of view of this magazine, this distinguished professor of international law in Cambridge University is on solid ground.